Hahn v. Superior Court: Failing to Take the Doctrine of Strict Premises Liability to Its Logical Conclusion by Prieguez, Raquel Maria
Notes
Hahn v. Superior Court: Failing to Take
the Doctrine of Strict Premises Liability
to Its Logical Conclusion
In Hahn v. Superior Court, a California court has once again
refused to apply Becker v. IRM Corp.'s strict liability rule to
commercial establishments. The crucial fact in Becker, the exis-
tence of a warranty of habitability, is not present in Hahn, said
the court. But as this Note shows, defective commercial establish-
ments place the public in as much risk of harm as manufacturers
of defective products. If the strict liability policy considerations of
accident reduction and risk distribution have any meaning, they
are clearly applicable to commercial licensors of defective prem-
ises, such as Hahn. The Hahn court's reluctance to so hold is an-
other example of courts' unwillingness to take the doctrine of
strict premises liability to its logical conclusion.
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Twentieth century tort law has seen the expansion of liability to
categories of defendants who were traditionally immune. Reforms
began early in the century with the landmark decision of MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Co.,' in which a manufacturer of an automobile
was held liable for injuries resulting from a defective wooden wheel
despite the absence of privity between him and the injured party. In
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
the years that followed, the principles of negligence were increas-
ingly broadened to promote the compensation of victims,2 and plain-
tiff-oriented doctrines, such as res ipsa loquitur, began to be more
aggressively applied.3 Departures from the general rules limiting lia-
bility were not confined to the area of products, but were recognized
in other domains. Significant inroads to the age-old principle that
possessors of land were generally immune from liability had already
been made4 when the California Supreme Court held in Rowland v.
Christian' that landowners and occupiers owed a general duty of
care to all who entered their property.
These developments eventually led the California Supreme Court
in Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc.' to hold manufacturers strictly
liable for injuries resulting from defective products. Twenty-two
years later, in Becker v. IRM Corp.,7 residential landlords were also
held to be strictly liable for injuries caused by latent defects in the
leased premises. In the meantime, strict liability was applied to all
those who were part of the marketing chain of products.8 The doc-
trine of strict liability seemed boundless. But this was soon to
change. In Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,' service providers
were excluded from the doctrine's purview. And since Becker, no
California court has applied the doctrine of strict liability to any
other type of landowner or occupier. The pendulum is swinging back
toward limiting strict liability. 10
This Note argues that the development of the doctrine of strict
premises liability was arrested prematurely, that in their effort to
curb the tide of plaintiff compensation, the courts in California have
overlooked the logic and strong policies favoring the extension of
strict liability to commercial establishments which attract the public.
This issue is discussed in the context of a recent case, Hahn v. Supe-
rior Court," in which the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the doctrine of strict liability was not applicable to the
owner of a shopping mall.
Part II of this Note presents and analyzes the facts of Hahn and
2. See Rose v. Melody Lane, 39 Cal. 2d 481, 247 P.2d 335 (1952).
3. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Newing v.
Cheatham, 15 Cal. 3d 351, 540 P.2d 33, 124 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1975).
4. See Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944); Hansen v.
Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
5. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
6. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
7. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
8. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
9. 40 Cal. 3d 672, 710 P.2d 247, 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1985).
10. See generally FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTs (1956).
11. 1 Cal. App. 4th 1448, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 502 (1991).
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its holding. The analysis shows that the Hahn court's decision to ap-
ply Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, Inc.12 was misguided. Part II
then examines the Hahn court's rationale for restricting the Becker
decision to residential landlords and finds it unpersuasive. While
commercial landlords such as Hahn are not held to a warranty of
habitability, the same policy considerations which supported the im-
position of strict liability in Becker strongly support the extension of
strict liability to Hahn. As a commercial landlord in control of a
defective common area open to the public, Hahn should have been
held strictly liable for the injuries incurred by plaintiffs on his
premises.
Part III argues for a broader proposition: that Hahn should also
have been strictly liable as a licensor of a defective premise open to
the public. In reaching this conclusion, Part III examines the deci-
sion in Garcia v. Halstead,"3 in which a licensor of a defective prod-
uct was subject to strict liability. It also argues against the views
expressed in Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 4 to show why
the policies of strict liability require that all commercial licensors of
defective products or premises should be included under the strict
liability umbrella. Lastly, to identify the limits of strict premises lia-
bility, Part III discusses the importance of a defect in the premises
and the business establishment's relation to the public as require-
ments for the doctrine. In brief, not all licensors of premises should
be held strictly liable for injuries due to defects, but just those, such
as restaurant and shopping mall owners, who license their premises
to the public.
II. HAHN V. SUPERIOR COURT
A. Factual and Procedural Background
In Hahn v. Superior Court,15 plaintiffs Martin and Rogers sus-
tained injuries when a tree fell on them while they were having
lunch in an outdoor courtyard. 6 Martin and Rogers had purchased
their lunch from the Farmer's Market, a restaurant located in a
12. 99 Cal. App. 2d 484, 222 P.2d 19 (1950).
13. 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970).
14. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 104,
at 719 (5th ed. 1984).
15. 1 Cal. App. 4th 1448, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 502 (1991).
16. Id. at 1450, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502-03. The court opinion did not elaborate on
the extent of plaintiffs' injuries.
shopping mall in San Diego.17 Defendant Hahn, owner of the restau-
rant and the shopping mall, provided the chairs and table where
plaintiffs were seated.18
Martin and Rogers each filed a suit for negligence, later adding a
cause of action for strict liability. Their separate actions were consol-
idated for trial. Before trial, Hahn moved to demur the strict liabil-
ity cause of action; the trial court overruled the demurrer, and Hahn
appealed. 19 The next section discusses the results of this appeal.
B. The Hahn Court's Decision and Rationale
The court recognized that the sole issue before it was whether de-
fendant Hahn could be held strictly liable in tort for the injuries
suffered by plaintiffs Martin and Rogers.2 ° In reaching its decision to
deny the strict liability cause of action, the court discussed the doc-
trine of strict liability as applying only to producing and marketing
enterprises responsible for placing products in the stream of com-
merce.21 It held that with respect to premises liability, the landmark
decision of Rowland v. Christian2 applied: whether the landowner
"in the management of his property 'has acted as a reasonable man
in view of the probability of injury to others.' ,,23 However, because
Martin and Rogers were invitees, having been expressly or implicitly
invited by Hahn to enter the shopping mall for his advantage, the
governing principle was that of Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club.24
The Hahn court noted that in Brown, the property owner was held
not to be an insurer of the invitee's safety but was nevertheless re-





21. Id. at 1452, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504.
22. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
23. Hahn, I Cal. App. 4th at 1450, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503 (quoting Rowland v.
Christian, 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104). In Rowland, plain-
tiff, a social guest of defendant, was injured in defendant's apartment when the handle of
the bathroom faucet cracked in his hand. The defendant had notified the lessor of the
broken handle, but failed to inform plaintiff of the danger before he entered the bath-
room. The court held that when an occupier of land is aware of a concealed condition
which may pose an unreasonable risk of harm to those coming into contact with it, fail-
ing to warn of the danger or to make adequate repairs can constitute negligence. In so
holding, the Rowland court abolished the long-standing common law tradition of treating
possessors of land as a special category of defendant, one whose duty of care shifted with
the status of the injured party. No longer would the liability of landowners or occupiers
turn on whether the injured party was a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee. Henceforth,
all land owners or occupiers would be held to a single duty of reasonable care in all
circumstances. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text for more details on the
Rowland decision.
24. 99 Cal. App. 2d 484, 222 P.2d 19 (1950).
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safe condition and warn of any latent or concealed peril."2
The court in Hahn next addressed plaintiffs' contention that the
rule in Becker v. IRM Corp.26 applied.17 It recognized that in
Becker, the California Supreme Court held that a residential land-
lord was strictly liable in tort for the injuries caused by latent de-
fects in the premises existing at the time of leasing.28 Nevertheless,
the Hahn court declared that "[t]here is no basis to extend the
Becker rationale to commercial premises liability. '29 In so holding,
the Hahn court characterized the decision in Becker as one which
was based on "the theory of an implied warranty of habitability and
the need to provide safe, urban housing to the public."30 Because
defendant Hahn was not in the business of leasing residential prop-
erty to the public, nor of producing or distributing goods found in
the stream of commerce, he could not be strictly liable for plaintiffs'
injuries.3 ' As a commercial landlord "holding its premises open to
the public," Hahn was subject to the traditional rule requiring that
some measure of fault exist before liability is imposed. 32 The Hahn
court concluded that Becker does not "require or portend" that strict
liability apply to all invitees who are injured in the common areas of
commercial establishments, including supermarkets, restaurants, the-
aters, and department stores.33
The court in Hahn, however, did agree with plaintiffs that the two
25. Hahn, I Cal. App. 4th at 1450, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503 (citing Smith v. Kern
County Land Co., 51 Cal. 2d 205, 208, 331 P.2d 645 (1959); Brown v. San Francisco
Ball Club, 99 Cal. App. 2d at 486, 222 P.2d at 20). In Brown, plaintiff was struck and
injured by a baseball at a baseball stadium. In finding the defendant not liable, the court
held that the duty of a proprietor or operator of a stadium toward his patrons is met
when he provides as many screened seats as patrons may reasonably be expected to call
for on any ordinary occasion. Brown, 99 Cal. App. 2d at 488, 222 P.2d at 21. See infra
notes 48-52 and accompanying text for additional details regarding the facts of the case,
the court's holding, and the applicability of the Brown court's decision in Hahn.
26. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
27. Hahn, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 1451, 3 Cal. Rptr 2d. at 503.
28. Id. In Becker, plaintiff tenant was injured when he fell through an untempered
glass shower door. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 457, 698 P.2d at 117, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
Both plaintiff and defendant agreed that the risk of injury would have been substantially
reduced had the shower door been made of tempered glass. Undoubtedly, this supported
the extension of strict liability to defendant landlord. Id. See infra text accompanying
notes 73-89 for a thorough analysis of the Becker decision and why it should apply in
Hahn.
29. Hahn, I Cal. App. 4th at 1452, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504.





cases constituting the relevant precedent in this area, Muro v. Supe-
rior Court34 and Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc.,35 were
distinguishable from Hahn.36 In both of these cases, the courts re-
fused to extend strict liability beyond the landlord-tenant relation-
ship, though for different reasons. In Muro, the court emphasized
the fact that plaintiff was an employee of the commercial tenant,37
and in Pierson, the court characterized defendant hospital as a ser-
vice provider, not subject to strict liability.38 In contrast, plaintiffs
34. 184 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 229 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1986). In Muro, plaintiff em-
ployee slipped and fell on stairs in the commercial building where he worked. The stairs
were allegedly defective because they were slippery and no runner was on the flooring to
prevent people from falling. The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer on the strict
liability cause of action without leave to amend, and plaintiff appealed. Id. at 1091-92,
229 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
35. 216 Cal. App. 3d 340, 264 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1989). In Pierson, plaintiff brought
causes of action for negligence and strict liability against Sharp Memorial Hospital for
injuries she incurred at the hospital. While visiting her husband, a patient of defendant
hospital, plaintiff fell due to an allegedly defective carpet. The trial court granted defend-
ant's motion for non-suit on the negligence claim and her motion to strike the strict
liability claim. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the ruling on the strict liability cause of
action. Id. at 342 & n.1, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 673-74 & n.l.
36. Hahn, 1 Cal. App. 4that 1451, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504.
37. Muro, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1089, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 383. In declining to extend
the strict liability rule articulated in Becker to lessors of commercial real property, the
Muro court acknowledged that residential landlords could be held strictly liable for inju-
ries incurred in a defective common area. Because they have a duty to inspect common
areas under their control and because the implied warranty of habitability covers com-
mon areas, landlords cannot be excused from strict liability for lack of actual knowledge
of the defect. Id. at 1092, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 385. For an analysis of the Muro court's
decision and Muro's applicability in Hahn, see infra text accompanying notes 90-98.
38. Pierson, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 346, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 676. Plaintiff contended
that the hospital should be held strictly liable because it was "part of the enterprise of
producing and marketing hospital rooms to the public." Id. at 342, 264 Cal. Rptr. at
674. The court disagreed. In reaching the decision not to extend the doctrine of strict
liability to the defendant hospital, it reviewed cases which declined to impose strict liabil-
ity on service providers, including Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 672,
710 P.2d 247, 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1985) (pharmacist); Pena v. Sita World Travel, Inc.,
88 Cal. App. 3d 642, 152 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1978) (travel agent); Shepard v. Alexian Bros.
Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973) (hospital furnishing blood to
patients); Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187
(1971) (hospital furnishing surgical needle to surgeon). These cases, the court noted,
stood for the proposition that strict liability does not apply to transactions where the
"primary objective is obtaining services" or to situations where the service aspect of the
transaction "predominates" and the sale of the product is "merely incidental to the provi-
sion of the service." Pierson, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 344-45, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 675. Quoting
yet another case, Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 489, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (1954), the
court emphasized that those who hire service providers should not expect perfection but
only reasonable care. Service providers have a duty to exercise reasonable care in their
profession, and should they fail to discharge that duty, they are liable under negligence
law. Pierson, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 345, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 675. The Pierson court also
reviewed the law on strict products liability, id. at 344, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 675, and on
strict premises liability, id. at 343-344, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 674. With respect to Becker, it
quoted Muro's ruling that "'Becker was intended to be restricted to landlords of residen-
tial property. There is no public policy rationale warranting the extension of Becker be-
yond its obvious intent.'" Pierson, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 343-44, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 674
(quoting Muro, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1089, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 389). As will be shown,
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here were invitees of Hahn, not employees, and the restaurant and
shopping mall were establishments which are not immune from strict
liability since they could not be characterized as service providers.
Martin and Rogers therefore contended that they were more like
plaintiff tenant in Becker, powerless to protect themselves from the
latent defects existing in Hahn's property.39 They further contended
that strict liability should be imposed on Hahn because, like the
landlord in Becker, Hahn was in a better position to inspect for de-
fects and bear the cost of injuries resulting from the defects.4° The
court, however, did not agree with either of these contentions. In-
stead, the Hahn court held firm to the bright line rule distinguishing
landlords of residential housing from landlords of commercial realty.
C. Analysis
1. The Brown Rule Is Inapplicable in Hahn
In Rowland v. Christian,4 the California Supreme Court abro-
gated the common law rule which based liability on the status of the
injured party to establish that landowners owed a general duty of
care to all who entered their premises.42 The status of the injured
party-invitee, licensee or trespasser 44-was only one of a number of
however, a strong case can be made for imposing strict liability for injuries caused by
defective premises on commercial establishments open to the public. See infra text ac-
companying notes 106-39.
39. Hahn, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 1451, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504.
40. Id.
41. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
42. Id. at 118-119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. It is interesting to note
that in reaching its decision, the Rowland court relied on § 1714 of the California Civil
Code, which declares that
"[e]very one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully
or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself."
Id. at 111-12, 443 P.2d at 563-64, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100 (quoting CAL. CiV. CODE
§ 1714). Although this particular code was enacted as early as 1872, it appears that
Rowland was the first time the California Supreme Court considered it in determining a
landowner's duty of care. One can only speculate as to why it took the court more than
ninety years to give effect to the code if, as the court seems to imply, it served as "the
foundation for our negligence law." Id.
43. Rowland defines these terms as follows:
Generally speaking a trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land of
another without a privilege to do so; a licensee is a person like a social guest
who is not an invitee and who is privileged to enter or remain upon land by
virtue of the possessor's consent, and an invitee is a business visitor who is
invited or permitted to enter or remain on the land for a purpose directly or
indirectly connected with the business dealings between them.
factors which may have "some bearing" on the issue of landowner's
liability.44 Yet in Hahn, the court declared that the applica-
ble rule was articulated in Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club,45 a
case adjudicated eighteen years before the landmark Rowland deci-
sion.46 In view of the Rowland decision that "status [of the injured
party] is not determinative," 4 the Hahn's court's reliance on Brown,
a case which predicated liability on status, appears misguided.
The decision in Brown is inapplicable for a number of other rea-
sons. In Brown, plaintiff was injured when she was hit by a baseball
while she sat in an unscreened portion of the stadium.48 The Brown
court recognized that the owner of the property is not an insurer of
the invitee's safety; nevertheless, the court also recognized that his
duty was relative and depended on many factors, including "the ca-
pacity and opportunity of the invitor to protect the invitee and the
capacity and opportunity of the invitee to protect himself. ' 49 The
court further noted that, in the context of a baseball game, specta-
tors are also participants and so assume the risk inherent in and inci-
dent to the game.50 The risks are also commonly known or readily
observable to those exercising reasonable care.51 Based on these find-
ings, the court held that defendant was not liable not only because
Id. at 113-14, 443 P.2d at 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
44. Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 56, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. The court noted that the new
approach to landowner or occupier liability would entail the balancing of a number of
factors, including
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defend-
ant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defend-
ant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to
the defendant and consequence to the community of imposing a duty to exer-
cise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prev-
alence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id. at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
45. 99 Cal. App. 2d 484, 222 P.2d 19 (1950).
46. Hahn, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 1450, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503.
47. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
48. Brown, 99 Cal. App. 2d at 486, 222 P.2d at 20.
49. Id. at 487, 222 P.2d at 20.
50. Id.
51. Brown, 99 Cal. App. at 489, 222 P.2d at 21. Plaintiff, however, contended that
she was ignorant of the game of baseball. She had seen just one game, twenty-two years
before the one in which she suffered her injuries, and that game had been played "in a
big field, not a ball park." Id. at 488, 222 P.2d at 21. Plaintiff also maintained that
although she had been at the game for about an hour, she had not been paying attention
to it but had spent the time "visiting with a friend." Id. at 488-89, 222 P.2d at 21.
Consequently, she had not knowingly assumed the risk of being struck by a baseball. The
court was not sympathetic even though one of the elements or the defense of assumption
of the risk is actual comprehension of the risk, Nunez v. R'Bibo, 211 Cal. App. 3d 559,
563, 260 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. d
(1965) ("A subjective standard is applied to assumption of risk, in determining whether
the plaintiff knows, understands, and appreciates the risk."). The court held that the
risks were "common knowledge" and imputed knowledge of the risks to her. Brown, 99
Cal. App. at 489, 222 P.2d at 21. In also noting that the risks were obvious and should
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he had fully discharged his duty of care by providing an adequate
number of screened seats, but also because plaintiff had knowingly
assumed the risk of being hit by a baseball.
52
In Hahn, however, neither Rogers or Martin assumed the risk of
being hit by a tree. This particular risk is not inherent in or incident
to having lunch in a courtyard of a shopping mall, nor are unsteady
trees obvious or readily observable even by those exercising reasona-
ble care. In addition, while common knowledge may inform one that
trees do fall, the likelihood of such an occurrence at a carefully cre-
ated and maintained environment is rather small, much smaller in-
deed than the possibility of being struck by a baseball in a baseball
park. It is also important to note that the court in Brown spoke not
of inflexible rules and duties, but instead made it clear that the prop-
erty owner's duty of care is relative and depends on his capacity and
opportunity to protect the invitee. Although the property owner is
not an insurer of the invitee, he still owes a duty to keep his premises
in a reasonably safe condition because he is best able to do so.
53
Apart from noting that plaintiff was, as in Brown, an invitee, the
Hahn court did not explain why Brown's rule was applicable here. In
view of the differences in context, type of accident and plaintiffs'
abilities to either protect themselves or assume the risk, it would
seem that the rule expressed in Brown is a rather unlikely choice.
This is so even without considering that the decision in Rowland vir-
tually repudiated the common law classification scheme or at least
considerably reduced its significance in determining a landowner's
duty of care.
2. Becker's Strict Liability Rule Should Apply in
Hahn
The court in Hahn decided not to include commercial lessors
under Becker's strict liability umbrella primarily because, in Becker,
strict liability was founded on the theory of an implied warranty of
habitability.54 A close examination of the Becker decision reveals,
however, that the Becker court did not base its decision entirely on
the existence of a warranty of habitability, as the Hahn court claims.
Rather, the Becker court used the warranty theory to support its
have been observed by plaintiff, the court showed itself to be unwilling to let plaintiff
benefit from her own failure to exercise ordinary care.
52. Brown, 99 Cal. App. at 488-89, 222 P.2d at 21.
53. See id. at 486-87, 222 P.2d at 20.
54. Hahn, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 1452, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504.
decision to subject landlords to strict liability. By recognizing that
consumers hold warranties of merchantability, much as tenants hold
warranties of habitability, the court established the link it needed to
apply the strict liability principles governing the sale of products to
the field of real estate transactions involving the lease of a dwell-
ing. 5 The Hahn court's notion that strict liability is not applicable to
landlords who are not bound by a warranty of habitability becomes
all the more suspect when one considers that the policy considera-
tions supporting Becker's strict liability rule also played a large role
in the recognition of the warranty of habitability.
a. The Theory of an Implied Warranty of Habitability:
Green v. Superior Court"6
A review of the case in which a warranty of habitability was first
implied reveals how significant the policy considerations of strict lia-
bility were to the making of that decision. In Green v. Superior
Court,5 7 the court began its discussion by pointing out the parallels
in development between the "factual changes in the landlord-tenant
field" and the "equally dramatic changes in the prevailing legal doc-
trines governing commercial transactions." 58 The latter develop-
ments, it noted, have led courts, "[iln seeking to protect the
reasonable expectations of consumers," to discard the caveat emptor
approach in favor of a warranty of fitness and merchantability and,
in recent years, to imply a warranty of fitness in contracts for the
construction of new housing. 59
The court then compared the modern tenant with the modern con-
sumer, underscoring the similarities in position between tenants and
consumers on the one hand and marketers of personalty and land-
lords on the other. In so doing, it pointed out that "[i]n most signifi-
cant respects, the modern urban tenant is in the same position as any
55. See Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 459-65, 698 P.2d at 119-23, 213 Cal Rptr. at 216-
20.
56. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
57. The Green case involved an unlawful retainer action. The landlord filed suit in
small claims court seeking possession of the leased premises and back rent in the amount
of $300. The tenant acknowledged that he had not paid the rent, but defended his posi-
tion on the grounds that the leased premises were uninhabitable. The court granted pos-
session of the premises to the landlord and entered a judgment in his favor for $225. The
tenant appealed, and a superior court heard his case de novo. The court stated that the
repair and deduct provisions of the civil code, Cal. Civ. Code § 1941, constituted plain-
tiff's exclusive remedies and held for the landlord, affirming the small claim court's judg-
ment. Plaintiff again appealed, but the court of appeals denied the writ. Finally, the
supreme court heard the case and overturned the lower courts' holdings, establishing for
the first time an implied warranty of habitability for residential leases in California. Id.
at 620-22, 517 P.2d at 1170-72, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 706-08.
58. Id. at 626, 517 P.2d at 1174, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
59. Id.
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other normal consumer of goods." 60 By way of a residential lease, "a
tenant seeks to purchase 'housing' from his landlord for a specified
period of time. '61 The landlord, in turn, is in a similar position as
any normal marketer of goods: the landlord "sells" housing to the
tenant, "enjoying a much greater opportunity, incentive and capacity
than a tenant to inspect and maintain the condition of his apartment
building."6 2 Thus, the court concluded that "[a] tenant may reasona-
bly expect that the product he is purchasing is fit for the purpose for
which it is obtained, that is, a living unit.16 3 And so a tenant's ex-
pectations, like the expectations of consumers, are entitled to formal
legal protection.
The court in Green, however, did not base its decision to imply a
warranty of habitability in leases for dwellings entirely on the simi-
larity in position between tenants and consumers. It also pointed to
the geographic and economic changes that have taken place in the
landlord-tenant relationship. As opposed to his agrarian counterpart,
who primarily acquired an interest in land, the modern urban
dweller contracts for a place to live.64 The complexity of modern
apartment buildings, moreover, "renders them much more difficult
and expensive to repair . . . but also makes adequate inspection of
the premises by a prospective tenant a virtual impossibility; ... and
the landlord, who has had experience with the building, is certainly
in a much better position to discover and to cure dilapidations in the
premises."6 5 In contrast, the urban dweller, unlike the "jack of all
trades" farmer, lacks the incentive, the skills, and the wherewithal to
maintain the premises.66 Indeed, given the enormous transformation
in the housing market brought about by urbanization and population
growth, modern-day tenants have "little bargaining power through
which they can gain express warranties of habitability from land-
lords. ' 67 Finally, the shortage of housing leaves tenants with "no re-
alistic alternative [s]," rendering inadequate the few common law
remedies available to them.68
But the court's discussion of these developments actually supports




64. Id. at 623, 517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
65. Id. at 624, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
66. Id. at 624-25, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
67. Id. at 625, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
68. Id. at 625, 517 P.2d at 1174, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
the argument that in deciding to recognize the warranty of habitabil-
ity, the Green court was guided by the same policy concerns which
led to the earlier adoption of strict products liability. The Green
court spoke of the inability of the modern tenant to inspect and re-
pair his apartment much as Justice Traynor spoke of the consumer
as no longer having the means or skill to investigate for himself the
soundness of a product when he first introduced the doctrine of strict
products liability in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.6 9 To the same
69. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467,150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). Al-
though Justice Traynor wrote the majority opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Products, 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), the case in which the doctrine of
strict liability was formally applied to manufacturers of products, he did not expound
upon the reasons supporting this decision in Greenman. Instead, he referred the reader to
his concurring opinion in Escola, in which he laid out the policy considerations underly-
ing strict liability with considerable cogency. Greenman, 24 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
In Escola, plaintiff, a waitress, was injured when a Coca Cola bottle which she was
moving from the case to the refrigerator broke in her hand. The defendant was a bottler
who filled both new and used bottles. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 456, 150 P.2d at 437. During
the trial, an expert testified about how bottles were tested by the manufacturer, stating
that the test is "'pretty near infallible.'" Id. at 460, 150 P.2d at 440. The bottler, how-
ever did not subject used bottles to this test, but to a visual inspection. This led the
supreme court to conclude that "if such defects do occur in used bottles there is a duty
upon the bottler to make appropriate tests before they are refilled, and if such tests are
not commercially practicable the bottles should not be re-used." Id. at 460-61, 150 P.2d
at 440 (emphasis added). The court also noted that whether the explosion was caused by
an excessive charge or a defect in the glass, "there [was] a sufficient showing that neither
cause would ordinarily have been present if due care had been used." Id. at 461, 150
P.2d at 440. The court further indicated that defendant had exclusive control over the
process of charging and inspecting the bottles. Thus, all the elements of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur had been met and the inference of negligence established. Defendant
now had to convince the jury that he had not been negligent. Liability would attach upon
his failure to dispell the inference. Id.
A close examination of the majority's reasoning in Escola, however, casts doubt on the
court's conclusion. In order for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, plaintiff must
show that (1) the accident was of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
negligence, (2) the accident was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the ex-
clusive control of the defendant, and (3) the accident must not have been due by any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. Id. at 457-59, 150 P.2d at
438-39. Yet in Escola, the facts failed to support at least the first element of the doc-
trine. The court actually mentioned that it was unknown whether the cause of the acci-
dent was an excessive charge or a defect in the glass. Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440. Indeed,
in the indirect manner noted above, the court also acknowledged that it did not know
whether used bottles even develop defects. How one can determine that an accident in
which a used bottle exploded is the result of someone's negligence without knowing
whether defects in used bottles can occur, let alone whether the particular bottle in ques-
tion was defective, is difficult to comprehend. Moreover, nothing in the facts indicated
that the bottler had been negligent in his duty to inspect the bottle visually. On the
contrary, the court remarked that "defendant presented evidence tending to show that it
exercised considerable precaution by carefully regulating and checking the pressure in
the bottles and by making visual inspections for defects in the glass at several stages
during the bottling process." Id. It therefore seems that the majority in Escola was
stretching the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when it held that an inference of negligence
had been established by the facts of the case.
Justice Traynor clearly noticed the majority's struggle in fitting the facts in Escola to
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. He chose to take a more direct route to establish the
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effect, the Green court also discussed the landlord's superior position
to discover and bear the cost of repairs, again much as Justice Tray-
nor described the manufacturer's capacity to "anticipate some
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public
cannot." 0 While the court in Green did not specifically refer to Jus-
tice Traynor's strict liability policy considerations when it discussed
the "enormous factual changes in the landlord-tenant field," 7' it is
evident that the rationale for strict products liability played a large
role in the decision to imply a warranty of habitability, particularly
in those situations where the injured party has neither the opportu-
nity or power to protect himself.
b. The Becker Decision and Its Policy Rationale
In view of Green, it is not surprising to find that the Becker court
relied on the warranty theory, a theory already rooted in policy, and
on related case law developments to support its decision to apply
strict liability. However, one should not be misled, as the court in
Hahn was misled, by the Becker court's reliance on the theory of an
implied warranty of habitability. Contrary to the Hahn court's asser-
tion, the Becker court did not base its decision to transform tradi-
tional premises liability on the existence of the theory of an implied
warranty of habitability. Warranties in and of themselves do not re-
quire the imposition of strict liability. To understand the rationale
bottler's liability: "It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and
impose what is in reality liability without negligence. If public policy demands that a
manufacturer of goods be responsible for their quality regardless of negligence there is no
reason not to fix that responsibility openly." Id. at 463, 150 P.2d at 441. Justice Traynor
went on to articulate the policy considerations supporting the imposition of strict liability:
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibil-
ity be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market.... The cost of an
injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.
Id at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
In this way, Justice Traynor set forth the twin goals of strict liability: accident reduc-
tion and risk distribution. It took another 19 years before a majority of the supreme
court was ready to impose strict liability in tort on manufacturers for injuries resulting
from defects in their products. But by the time the court finally made this decision in
Greenman, the wisdom of Justice Traynor's policy considerations was widely acknowl-
edged. See FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF ToRTs § 28.15-28 (1956); William
L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel of Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960).
70. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
71. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 626, 517 P.2d at 1174, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
behind the Becker court's decision, one must look at the policy con-
siderations which guided the California Supreme Court's earlier de-
cision to impose strict products liability.
72
The Becker court began its analysis of the applicability of strict
liability by highlighting Justice Traynor's Escola opinion, in which
he pointed out that "'[t]he retailer, even though not equipped to test
a product, is under an absolute liability to his customer, for the im-
plied warranties of fitness for proposed use and merchantable quality
include a warranty of safety of the product.' 73 And later on, in
discussing the case which established strict products liability, Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 4 the Becker court noted that the
purpose of strict liability "'is to insure that the costs of injuries re-
sulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that
put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves.' -75
The Becker court next discussed the extension of strict products
liability to the area of real estate, indicating that the "[a]pplication
of warranty doctrine has not been limited to those engaged in com-
merce in personalty but has been applied where appropriate to those
engaged in the real estate business. 76 In so doing, it underscored the
similarities between the builders of new homes and manufacturers of
products: "'the builder or seller of new construction-not unlike the
manufacturer or merchandiser of personalty-makes implied repre-
sentations, ordinarily indispensable to the sale, that the builder has
used reasonable skill and judgment in constructing the building.' ",77
The court also underscored the similarities between the purchaser
and the consumer: "'the purchaser does not usually possess the
knowledge of the builder and is unable to fully examine a completed
house and its components without disturbing the finished
product.' ",78
The court followed this with a review of several cases where the
developer had been held strictly liable for a defective heating sys-
teM7 9 and a subsidence problem,80 and here again, the court noted
72. See supra note 69.
73. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 459, 698 P.2d at 118, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215 (quoting
Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 464, 150 P.2d at 441).
74. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
75. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 459, 698 P.2d at 118, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215 (quoting
Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701).
76. Id. at 459-60, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
77. Id. at 460, 698 P.2d at 119, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (citing Pollard v. Saxe &
Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 379, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974)).
78. Id.
79. The Becker court cited Kriegler v. Eichler Homes Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224,
74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969), where a builder installed a faulty heating system in one of his
mass-produced homes. The builder was held strictly liable for the resulting damages.
80. The Becker court cited Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77
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the policy concerns underlying these decisions: "the public interest
dictates that the cost of injury from defects should be borne by the
developer who created the danger and who is in a better economic
position to bear the loss rather than the injured party who relied on
the developer's skills and implied representations."81 The Becker
court then turned to Green and the doctrine of habitability. And not
surprisingly, in its discussion of the theory, the Becker court focused
on Green's analogy of the modern tenant to the normal consumer of
goods, pointing out that "a tenant may reasonably expect that the
product purchased is fit as a living unit. 82
The Becker court did not end its discussion of supporting prece-
dent with Green. It subsequently brought up such cases as Fakhoury
v. Magner8" and Golden v. Conway,84 where strict liability was ap-
plied to landlords for injuries to tenants resulting from defective fur-
nishings in the former case and a defective wall heater in the latter
case.8 5 The Becker court then concluded, noting the rationale of the
foregoing cases, that a landlord is part of the "'overall producing
and marketing enterprise'" that makes housing available to lessors
and should, therefore, be held strictly liable in tort for injuries re-
sulting from a latent defect in the premises which existed at the time
the premises were let to the tenant.8 6
The Becker court also noted that implied warranties relating to
realty had long been recognized by courts.8 7 Yet in doing so, it fo-
cused not on the unequal bargaining power between landlord and
tenant or the scarcity of affordable housing, as the Hahn court im-
plied,88 but rather on those facets of the landlord-tenant relationship
that call for the imposition of strict liability. The Becker court un-
derscored the limited capacity of tenants to inspect the premises,
their expectations of safety, and the landlord's ability to bear or
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969), where a builder was held strictly liable, this time for the subsi-
dence caused by a defect in the preparation process of a residential lot.
81. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 460-61, 698 P.2d at 119-20, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17.
82. Id. at 462, 698 P.2d at 121, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
83. 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
84. 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
85. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
86. Id. In holding that landlords are part of the chain for producing and marketing
housing, the court appears to be viewing housing itself as a product and the role of the
landlord as being no different from that of merchandisers of products. The court further-
more noted the extent to which landlords engage in the marketing of housing: "A land-
lord, like defendant owning numerous units, is not engaged in isolated acts within the
enterprise but plays a substantial role." Id.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
spread the costs of injuries, the very policy reasons which led the
court in Greenman to impose strict liability on manufacturers. 89
c. The Applicability of Policy, Not the Existence of a Warranty
of Habitability, Should Determine Whether
Strict Liability Applies
From the foregoing analysis it should be clear that the courts in
Green and Becker founded their decisions on the same public safety
considerations. Thus, while the Hahn court and others may point out
that Becker's application of strict liability to landlords was founded
on the warranty of habitability, it was the policy reasons underlying
the warranty theory, not the existence of the theory itself, which sup-
ported first, in Green, the adoption of the warranty theory, in the
context of realty and later, in Becker, the imposition of strict liabil-
ity on landlords who are in the business of leasing residential dwell-
ings. Indeed, in view of the similarities in policy underlying the
Green and Becker decisions, the Hahn court's notion that strict lia-
bility is not applicable to commercial landlords because they are not
bound by a warranty of habitability is difficult to understand. In
Hahn, as in any case where the policy considerations underlying
both the Green and Becker decision apply, the issue of the existence
of a warranty of habitability should be irrelevant. Again this is be-
cause Becker's strict liability rule was not predicated on the recogni-
tion of the theory of an implied warranty of habitability as much as
on the policy considerations that supported both the theory's recogni-
tion and the imposition of strict liability. In sum, whether a lease
contains a warranty of habitability should not determine whether
strict liability applies. What should be dispositive is whether apply-
ing strict premises liability would further the doctrine's underlying
policy considerations.
D. Relevant Case Law and Analysis: Muro v. Superior Court 0
Hahn v. Superior Court is not the first case in which a court has
overlooked the policy reasons underlying Becker's rule of strict liabil-
ity in holding that strict liability does not apply due to the lack of a
warranty of habitability. In Muro v. Superior Court, the court
reached the same decision. Although the Muro court recognized that
strict liability applies where the injury is caused by latent defects in
the common area of an apartment house,91 it refused to extend strict
89. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464-65, 698 P.2d at 122-23, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219-20.
90. 184 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 229 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1986).
91. In Muro, plaintiff sustained an injury in a defective common area. See supra
note 34. In an effort to have the court limit the application of strict liability to the leased
premises proper, the defendant argued that a landlord is not strictly liable for injuries
540
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liability to landlords of commercial establishments, noting that
"neither the language nor the rationale of the Becker decision indi-
cates any intent to apply the strict liability doctrine announced
therein to landlords who lease commercial or industrial property."92
The court in Muro, like the court in Hahn, reasoned that the Becker
decision "was due to its previous holding that residential leases con-
tain an implied warranty of habitability." 93 Unlike the Hahn court,
however, the Muro court did not entirely ignore the policy considera-
tions underlying the warranty doctrine and the Becker decision. 94 In
a footnote, it expounded on this, stating that in adopting the war-
ranty theory, the court in Green had based its decision on tenants'
reasonable expectations of safety and their inability to inspect and
incurred in the common areas of an apartment complex. But the court rejected this con-
tention, stating that "[h]ad the injury here been caused by a latent defect in the common
area of an apartment house, it would appear that petitioner could state a strict liability
cause of action." Id. at 1092 n.1, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.1. Because the facts of Muro
involved a commercial and not a residential common area, the court's statements con-
cerning the availability of a strict liability cause of action for injuries sustained in a
defective common area could be considered dicta. The logic behind the court's state-
ments, however, cannot be contested. There is no reason why a landlord who is held
strictly liable for injuries resulting from a defective apartment should not be held strictly
liable for injuries resulting from a defective common area of the apartment building. A
tenant's expectations of safety and of suitability of use are no different whether he is
inside his apartment, just outside the front door, or on his way to it. As the Muro court
pointed out, the civil code, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.1(h) (West 1985), requires stairways
to be in good repair as a condition of tenantability. It also appears that this standard "is
also relevant to the definition of uninhabitability." Muro, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1092 n.1,
229 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.1.
It is therefore no surprise that the court in Hahn seems to agree that residential land-
lords are subject to strict liability for injuries sustained in defective common areas. The
Hahn court did reject plaintiffs contention that the Muro court recognized that a strict
liability cause of action would have been "more likely to follow" had the plaintiff in
Muro been injured by a defect in a common area controlled by the landlord. See Hahn, 1
Cal. App. 4th at 1451 n.2, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504 n.2. However, the Hahn court did not,
in so doing, contest the gdneral proposition forwarded by the Muro court that a landlord
would be subject to strict liability in those circumstances. See Hahn, 1 Cal. App. 4th at
1451 n.2, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504 n.2. Other reasons, such as the fact that plaintiff in
Muro was an employee, could have led the Muro court to reject the extension of strict
liability to the defendant landlord in that case. The consensus of the courts thus seems to
be that strict liability applies when the injury is sustained in a defective common area of
an apartment building under the control of the landlord.
92. Muro, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1093, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
93. Id. at 1095, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.
94. Id. at 1096, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 387. The Muro court declared that
[t]he policy consideration underlying the rationale of the Becker decision, like
the rationale of the Green decision . . ., is the need to insure safe, adequate
housing for modern, urban residential tenants who, like ordinary consumers,
are powerless to protect themselves. The responsibility is therefore placed on
the landlord, who is in a better position to bear the business costs.
Id. (emphasis added).
bear the cost of repairsf5 Nevertheless, in the end, the Muro court
shifted its focus back to the conditions of the housing market and the
inapplicability of the warranty theory. Agreeing with two commenta-
tors of the law, the Muro court noted:
This warranty [of habitability] resulted from the necessity of protecting the
health and safety of residential tenants who need adequate housing in a
market place where satisfactory housing is difficult to locate and the tenant
is unable to protect himself because of his lack of knowledge, ability and
bargaining position. These factors are not present in the leasing of nonresi-
dential premises where the tenant is more sophisticated, his bargaining posi-
tion is more equal to that of the landlord and, in the usual case, the
contents of the lease, including the obligation of maintenance, are negoti-
ated between the parties 6
In so holding, however, the court appears to have forgotten that
petitioner was injured in a common area under the control of the
commercial landlord. In addition, petitioner was not the tenant of
the commercial establishment but his employee, who, like the resi-
dential tenant, lacked the knowledge, ability, and bargaining position
to protect himself. Moreover, although the Muro court recognized
that "[s]trict liability in tort applies, of course, to a bystander,
'97 it
failed to show why petitioner could not be viewed as a bystander.
Unlike his sophisticated employer, petitioner had not taken part in
the negotiations of the lease and, like a bystander, petitioner had had
little opportunity to safeguard his interests. More important, the
court failed to show why bystanders who are injured in the common
area of apartment complexes are more deserving of protection than
bystanders who are injured in common areas of commercial com-
plexes. In short, by focusing exclusively on the position of the com-
mercial tenant with respect to the commercial landlord in deciding
that Becker's strict liability rule did not apply to commercial land-
lords,98 the Muro court missed a most significant point: the party
suing was not the commercial tenant, but his powerless employee.
95. Id. at 1096 n.5, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 387 n.5.
96. Id. at 1097, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (footnotes omitted) (quoting HARRY D.
MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 27:75
(rev. ed. 1977)).
97. Id. at 1092 n.1, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.l.
98. In support of its decision, the Muro court indicated that "a commercial tenant
cannot raise an implied warranty of habitability defense," that "there is no scarcity of
commercial property," and that "commercial tenants can also absorb the costs [of in-
jury] as a business expense." Id. at 1098, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 389. However, it should be
noted that none of these considerations applied to the real party in interest.
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E. Preliminary Conclusion: Strict Liability Should
Apply to Commercial Landlords, Such As Hahn, for
Injuries Resulting from Defects in the Common Areas over
Which the Landlords Retain Control
While commercial leases do not contain a warranty of habitability
or suitability of use, the position of commercial landlords is no differ-
ent from that of residential landlords with respect to those who enter
the premises. Like residential landlords, commercial landlords are
part of the "overall producing and marketing enterprise" that makes
commercial establishments available to commercial tenants. Com-
mercial landlords also are in a better position to inspect for defects
and to make the needed repairs than commercial tenants or their
invitees since commercial establishments, like residential buildings,
are complex structures whose heating, electrical, and plumbing sys-
tems may be inaccessable to them. The fact that the commercial
tenant might have contracted to maintain the portion of the building
which he has leased, moreover, should not release the landlord from
his responsibility to assure the safety of common areas over which he
has retained control, particularly when others who were not involved
in the negotiations were injured. Lastly, like the residential landlord,
the commercial landlord may be in a better position than his com-
mercial tenants to spread the costs of the injuries by making price
adjustments in his leases.
More important, the position of those entering commercial estab-
lishments, whether employees or invitees, is no different from the po-
sition of tenants of residential apartments with respect to strict
liability. It would be difficult to argue that employees have no rea-
sonable expectations of safety. In view of the multitude of worker's
compensation acts that already hold employers strictly liable for in-
juries incurred by employees on the job, one must believe that em-
ployees' expectations of safety are already part and parcel of the'law
of torts nationwide. 99 That invitees also have expectations of safety is
99. Indeed, the development of workers' compensation acts dates back to the mid-
nineteenth century when occupation injuries started to become widespread after the Civil
War. The common law made defenses, such as contributory negligence and assumption
of the risk, available to employers, making it difficult for a worker to recover. In the
1900s, the legislatures of various states responded by passing acts that broadened em-
ployers' liability, while in Europe, workers' compensation plans were being formulated.
By the end of the 1910s, New York had passed the first compulsory coverage system.
New York later amended its constitution to allow its legislature to enact a compensation
system, although the system was later ruled to be contrary to the state constitution. The
United States Supreme Court upheld the statute. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243
quite clear as well. Indeed, invitees' safety expectations may even be
higher than the safety expectations of those entering apartment
buildings, given that few customers would consider entering, let
alone choose to transact business in, an unsafe environment.100 It
also cannot be denied that the success of many commercial establish-
ments, particularly those open to the public, also depends to a signifi-
cant degree on their capacity to attract customers. Whether the
courts choose to recognize it, commercial establishments do and
must make representations of safety to those entering their premises.
Finally, those who enter commercial establishments, whether they be
categorized as employees, invitees, or bystanders, are just as power-
less to protect themselves against latent defects which threaten in-
jury as any tenant or guest of an apartment complex.
The court in Hahn, however, like the court in Muro, chose not to
extend the doctrine of strict liability to landlords of commercial es-
tablishments: "There is no basis to extend the Becker rationale to
commercial premises liability." 10 1 Yet as has been shown above, the
same policy reasons which compelled the application of strict liabil-
ity on residential landlords requires the same for commercial land-
lords, especially in respect to common areas over which the landlord
retains control. In Muro, strict liability should have been imposed on
the commercial landlord because, as in Becker, the policy considera-
tions underlying strict liability clearly called for its application.
For the very same reasons, strict liability should also have been
imposed on defendant Hahn. Recall that in Hahn, plaintiffs Martin
and Rogers were injured in a courtyard, and as the commercial land-
lord of the eating establishment where plaintiffs purchased their
U.S. 188 (1917). MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNA-
TIVES 682-84 (4th ed. 1987). For more information on the history of workers' compensa-
tion, see Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of
Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 50 (1967). From this it should be clear that
employees expect their workplace to be free of hazards.
100. This fact has long been recognized in the common law. Prior to Rowland,
landowners were held to the highest duty of care when an invitee had been injured.
While a landowner could not wantonly or willfully injure trespassers or licensees, the
latter were obliged to take the premises as they found them and could not recover for the
landowner's negligence in the management of his property. But the landowner did owe
the invitee the duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring him, and the invitee
could recover upon the landowner's failure to discharge this duty. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d
at 114, 443 P.2d at 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101. Judicial support for the idea that invitees
are owed a higher duty of care may also be observed in other, more recent opinions.
Consider Judge Leventhal's concurring opinion in one of the first cases which imposed a
general duty of care on landowners. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J., concurring). Judge Leventhal agreed that landowners
should be held to a general duty of care, but only when business establishments are
involved. Id. at 108. His point was that business establishments can insure the risk and
pass the costs on to customers, one of the goals of strict liability. Id.
101. Hahn, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 1452, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504.
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food, Hahn was responsible for the maintenance of this common eat-
ing area. As the Hahn court indicated, Hahn is not "in the business
of leasing residential property to the general public."1 °2 Hahn is also
not "a producer or distributor of goods. 10 3 Nevertheless, application
of strict liability to defendant Hahn would be supported by the same
considerations and would serve the same purpose as the imposition of
strict liability on the residential landlord in Becker. Indeed, because
Hahn was both the commercial lessor and the commercial landlord,
the proposition noted in Muro that commercial landlords should not
be subject to strict liability because commercial tenants are just as
sophisticated as commercial landlords and have equal bargaining
power is neither applicable nor persuasive here. But subjecting Hahn
to strict liability would, in the words of Justice Traynor, fix responsi-
bility where it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective premises and thus provide a safety in-
centive to landlords in the maintenance of their premises. Since the
commercial landlord, like the residential landlord, can easily bear or
spread the cost of injury by adjusting his prices or by purchasing
insurance, extending strict liability to Hahn would also effectuate the
"paramount policy of the strict products liability rule,"'1 4 the
spreading throughout society of the costs of compensating defense-
less victims of premises defects. Lastly, applying strict liability to
Hahn and other commercial landlords would also honor customers'
expectations of safety, expectations that have already received for-
mal legal protection with respect to products and residential
apartments.
This is not to say that by insisting that Hahn be held strictly liable
for defendants' injuries, one also argues for the application of strict
liability to "all invitees to the common areas of every commercial
establishment, be it a supermarket, a restaurant, a theater or a de-
partment store, and the abolishment of the traditional requirement
of some measure of fault for the imposition of liability," as the court
in Hahn declared. 10 5 Although, as will be shown below, analogies
may be drawn to support the application of strict liability to licen-
sors of defective premises, the focus here is to encourage the court to
eliminate the inconsistency in a body of law that holds landlords of
residential apartments strictly liable for injuries resulting from latent
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
105. Hahn, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 1452, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
defects in the building's apartments and common areas, but imposes
liability on, commercial landlords for injuries incurred in defective
common areas under their control only when negligence is proved. In
view of the policy considerations behind strict liability, this inconsis-
tency is neither warranted nor desirable.
III. LICENSE TO USE AND STRICT LIABILITY
A. Introduction
California courts have consistently held that the same policy con-
siderations supporting the application of strict liability to manufac-
turers apply as well to all those involved in the marketing chain. But
who is part of the marketing chain? In 1964 and 1965 respectively,
the courts held that retailers106 and wholesalers 10 7 were part of the
marketing chain.108 In 1969, lessors were included.109 And the fol-
lowing year, in Garcia v. Halsett, 0 the courts further expanded the
category to encompass those who are not directly involved in market-
ing but who nevertheless make products available to the public, such
as licensors of products.
B. Garcia v. Halsett: Strict Liability Applies to
Licensors of Products
In Garcia, an eleven-year-old boy caught his hand in a defective
washing 'Machine at a laundromat.111 The defendant contended that
the transaction between himself and the plaintiff client was a bail-
ment, for which he was not liable.1 2 The court disagreed with this
106. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964).
107. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1965).
108. Noting the courts' eagerness to apply the "twin goals of accident reduction
and risk distribution to the problem of injuries caused by products," commentators of the
law have described the extension of strict liability to different categories of merchants as
the strict products liability "revolution," Edmund Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective
Business Premises-One Step Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REv. 820,
825 (1975), and a "tidal wave, a flood, and a prairie fire," ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTUR-
ING TO Do JUSTICE 101 (1969).
109. McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 337 (1969).
110. 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970).
111. The defendant owner of the laundromat claimed that the machine in question
was safe, but the court found ample evidence that it was defective. The machine lacked a
safety "micro" switch which would have prevented the machine from starting when its
door was open. At the trial, an expert testified that micro switches were commonly in-
stalled by manufacturers on washing machines as early as 1952. The machine in question
was made in 1958. The court also noted that micro switches were quite inexpensive and
could be installed after manufacturing was complete. After the accident, defendant had
bought and installed twelve of them himself. Id. at 323, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 422-23.
112. Id. at 324, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 422. At this time, the courts had not yet applied
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characterization, noting that bailment requires the delivery of the
object to the bailee and that plaintiffs "assumed no responsibility for
the safekeeping of the machine, and did not have the right to remove
it or tamper with the mechanical parts of the washer. ' 113 Instead,
the court characterized the transaction as a license, defining the con-
cept as "a grant of permission to do a particular thing, to exercise a
certain privilege, or to carry on a particular business or to pursue a
certain occupation."" 4 The licensor gives permission "to do a thing
which the licensor could prevent."" 5 Applying this definition to the
facts of the case, the court concluded that because the owner of the
laundromat implicitly gave plaintiff permission to use the machines
and could have withheld that permission, plaintiff had actually ac-
quired a license to use the machines and could not be regarded as a
bailee."16
In discussing the applicability of strict liability, the Garcia court
explained that the relationship between the injured party and the
purveyor of the defective product has no bearing on whether the in-
jured party can recover. Citing Elmore v. American Motors Corp."
7
for the rule that injured bystanders may recover under the doctrine
of strict liability as victims of defective products, the court proceeded
to draw an analogy between plaintiff Garcia's position and that of an
innocent bystander. Like a bystander, Garcia had no control over the
machines and did not have the opportunity to inspect for defects that
were not apparent.""' Garcia was actually in a worse position than a
retail buyer, who generally has the opportunity to inspect the prod-
uct before buying and using it. Garcia's only fault was that he se-
lected and used a defective washing machine, and this, the court
insisted, should not bar his recovery.
The Garcia court explained that licensors "play more than a ran-
dom and accidental role in the overall marketing enterprise of the
the doctrine of strict liability to bailors. But just three months later in Price v. Shell Oil
Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970), the court held that there
was "no significant difference between a manufacturer or retailer who places an article
on the market by means of a sale and a bailor or lessor who accomplishes the same result
by means of a lease." Id. at 253, 466 P.2d at 727, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 183.




117. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
118. Garcia, 3 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
product."1 19 They provide products "to the public for use by the pub-
lic" 120 and are therefore "'an integral part of the overall... market-
ing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from
defective products.' "121 For this reason, the policy considerations un-
derlying strict liability apply "logically and desirably" to licensors of
products just as to manufacturers, retailers, and lessors.122
C. The Views Expressed in Prosser and Keeton:
Is a Defective Cart Like a Slippery Floor?
Since Garcia, no other California court has imposed strict liability
on a licensor of a defective product. But the significance of Garcia's
ruling did not go unnoticed by commentators of the law. For exam-
ple, the authors of Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 23 (Pros-
ser and Keeton) support the application of strict liability to licensors
of products, but only to a certain kind of licensor. They distinguish
licensors who are in the business of licensing the use of products on
their premises and charge for that use from licensors whose licensing
is incidental to their business and who do not charge directly for the
use of the product. 24 The owner of a laundromat is an example of
the former type of licensor; a grocery store owner who makes shop-
ping carts available to his customers is an example of the latter.
Prosser and Keeton would apply strict liability to the licensor who
charges for use, the laundromat owner, because he is like a lessor of
products, but not to the other type of licensor, the grocery store
owner, because his transactions with customers are "quite
different.
125
Whether this difference supports application of strict liability to
one type of licensor and not the other remains to be seen. But to
Prosser and Keeton, the difference between the laundromat and the
grocery cart transactions must have seemed significant and obvious.
In explaining this difference, they analogize the use of grocery carts
to the use of the floors in the store and contrast these two events
with the laundromat situation, all in one short sentence: "there is
little, if any, difference between using a defective shopping cart and
using a slippery floor."12z6 Prosser and Keeton leave one to assume
119. Id. at 326, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 325, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
122. Id. at 326, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
123. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
104 , at 719 (5th ed. 1984).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Thus, Prosser and Keeton seem to support the notion that some products,
such as defective carts, should not be subject to strict liability even when used extensively
by the public.
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that because negligence law, rather than strict liability, applies in
cases involving slippery floors, the same should hold for defective
carts.
But a defective cart is not necessarily like a slippery floor. A cart
can be dangerous either because of a design or manufacturing defect
or because it was damaged during use. Similarly, a floor can be dan-
gerous either because it is defective (made of a slippery material) or
because a customer spilled a slippery substance on it. Thus, while a
defective cart can be compared to a defective floor, there is a signifi-
cant difference between a defective cart and a non-defective slippery
floor. In failing to appreciate this difference, Prosser and Keeton
compared apples and oranges and reached a faulty conclusion.
The difference between a defective cart and a non-defective slip-
pery floor becomes particularly significant when one considers that
the owner's capacity to prevent an accident varies with the source of
the problem. While the store owner can clean a spill off the floor or
remove a damaged cart from use, 2 7 he has little control over cus-
tomers, who may render his store unsafe, and may be unable to act
quickly enough to repair the damage and prevent an accident. In
contrast, the store owner can prevent accidents that are caused by
defects. He can inspect new carts for safety and take care to provide
carts that are sound in design and manufacture. He can also inspect
the condition of new floors to ensure that they are not slippery.
Prosser and Keeton's analogy of defective carts and slippery floors
is therefore not a sound basis for distinguishing laundromat owners
from grocery store owners. Defective carts and floors are like defec-
tive washing machines: they are products whose defects can cause
injury. From this perspective, grocery store owners are like laundro-
mat owners: they are both part of the marketing chain because they
license the use of products to the public.
Indeed, upon close examination, there appears to be no significant
transactional difference between licensors who are engaged in the
very business of licensing the use of products and licensors who are
not. The business type of licensor, the laundromat owner, receives
payment directly from his clients for the use of his washing ma-
chines, but the non-business licensor, the grocery store owner, also
receives payment: the costs of purchasing and maintaining the carts
127. If the store owner has either actual or constructive knowledge of the danger-
ous condition, his failure to remedy the condition in a reasonable time may subject him
to liability under the principles of negligence articulated in Rowland v. Christian. See
supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
and floors are included in his customers' grocery bills. While Prosser
and Keeton may distinguish the transactions the grocery store owner
and the laundromat owner have with their customers, in the end,
both types of licensors have the same control over their products and
derive similar benefits from their respective transactions. Both types
of licensors are in the business of licensing the use of products to the
public.
How defective products find their way to the public, moreover, is
not a relevant factor in determining whether strict liability applies.
The courts have clearly indicated this by extending strict liability to
all who are part of the marketing chain, including licensors of prod-
ucts. Viewed from this perspective, Prosser and Keeton's notion that
one type should be subject to strict liability but not the other seems
misguided. Factors that have no bearing on the rationale behind
strict liability should not be used to determine whether strict liability
should apply. Rather, the adoption of strict liability should turn on
whether the injury was caused by a defect in the product and not on
the kind of transaction between the licensor and the user.
D. Policy Requires That Strict Liability Should Apply to All
Commercial Licensors of Defective Products
What also should be dispositive in determining whether strict lia-
bility is imposed on a particular type of merchant is whether its ap-
plication would serve the twin goals of strict liability-the reduction
of accidents and the distribution of risk. In the examples discussed
above, it is clear that when buying products for public use, the gro-
cery store owner, like the laundromat owner, has the choice of select-
ing from many manufacturers and retailers. He can choose to buy
the carts or floors from a manufacturer who is concerned with prod-
uct safety or from one who is more concerned with manufacturing
costs. Subjecting the grocery store owner to strict liability for inju-
ries resulting from defective carts would, as in the laundromat case,
help reduce accidents by fixing responsibility "wherever it will most
effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective
products that reach the market." ' Imposing strict liability on gro-
cery store owners for injuries caused by defective carts would also
serve the goal of risk distribution since the owner can insure the risk
of injury and distribute it "among the public as a cost of doing busi-
ness."' In sum, the social advantages of product safety and risk
distribution that strict liability provides call for its imposition on all
who are part of the marketing chain for a product regardless of
128. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944).
129. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
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whether they are in the business of providing that product or simply
permit customers to use the product.
Moreover, the same legal principles that apply when a defective
table causes injury at home should also apply when the same defec-
tive table causes injury in a restaurant. It makes no sense to have the
imposition of strict liability depend on whether the injured party
bought the product outright or simply bought the right to use it in a
restaurant. In both instances, the public policy considerations of
strict liability are applicable. Indeed, considering the extent to which
products in commercial establishments are used, more people are
likely to be injured by a defective product in a commercial establish-
ment than in a private home. This greater risk of injury to the public
makes the extension of strict liability to all commercial licensors
even more warranted than to retailers of products for home con-
sumption. In addition, when some merchants are held strictly liable
but not others, some products are likely to be better tested for safety
than others. Imposition of strict liability on all merchants, and
thereby on all products that reach the public, would unquestionably
strengthen the doctrine's effectiveness.
For these reasons, strict liability should be imposed on all licensors
of defective products, including owners of grocery stores, theaters,
airlines, sports facilities, and as in Hahn, eating areas in shopping
malls and restaurants. But this is not to say that licensors of prod-
ucts should always be held strictly liable for injuries incurred on
their premises. Negligence law should apply in accidents due to haz-
ardous but not defective conditions in restaurants, theaters, or air-
planes, as when a floor is made slippery by someone outside the
licensor's control. But injuries resulting from defects in prod-
ucts-the tables at which people sit in restaurants or the seats they
use in theaters, sports facilities, and airplanes-should be covered by
strict liability.
E. Strict Liability Should Apply to Hahn as a Licensor of
Defective Premises
Examining Hahn v. Superior Court in this light reveals that strict
liability should have been applied in the case. In Hahn, plaintiffs'
injuries occurred in a public eating area in a shopping mall, a care-
fully created and maintained environment. The injuries were caused
by a falling tree that should have been inspected for disease or
should not have been located where its fall could cause injury to in-
nocent people. Defendant Hahn was both the owner of the shopping
mall that provided the outdoor eating area where plaintiffs were in-
jured and the owner of the restaurant where plaintiffs bought their
lunch. In either role, defendant Hahn was responsible for the defec-
tive eating area in question. The tree, like a defective cart or wash-
ing machine, was under his control. Further, no evidence was
presented that indicated a customer at the shopping mall in any way
contributed to the tree's falling. From this it follows that plaintiffs'
injuries in Hahn cannot be categorized along with injuries resulting
from non-defective slippery floors. Instead, Hahn is an example of
one of a number of ways people may be injured by defective prod-
ucts for which they have acquired a license.
1. The Tree in Hahn Was a Defective Product
An opponent of extending strict liability to Hahn may argue that
the fallen tree was not a product. But while the tree was not manu-
factured, it was grown in a nursery by or for Hahn, and Hahn did
place it in an environment under his control. As with any other prod-
uct, Hahn probably received an implied warranty of suitability of
use when he bought the tree. He may have even replaced the tree
after the accident at the expense of the seller, for Hahn would cer-
tainly not have purchased the tree had he known of the defect, just
as he would not have purchased any other defective product.
An opponent of extending strict liability to Hahn may also argue
that the tree was not defective. This issue was not litigated in Hahn,
and so the court reached no conclusion regarding the reasons for its
falling. But if the tree fell because of disease, then it was defective,
like any product that fails to meet the purposes for which is was
made and sold. The tree was, in all these respects, no different from
any other product, and Hahn, as a licensor of a defective product,
should not have been treated any differently than the licensor of the
defective machine in Garcia. Rather, Hahn should have been held
strictly liable for the injuries that resulted from the defective tree.
But this does not say that strict liability should apply only when
the product is inherently defective. Recall that in Becker the un-
tempered glass in the shower door was deemed to be defective even
though officials of defendant Becker testified that before the accident
in question, no one had been injured by a shower door. 130 They also
testified that tempered glass may not have been available at the time
the shower doors were installed in the apartment building. 13' No one
was even aware that the shower doors were made of untempered
130. Id. at 458, 698 P.2d at 117-18, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15.
131. The apartment complex in Becker was built in 1962 and 1963; plaintiff
bought the complex in 1974. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d 454, 457-58, 698 P.2d 116, 117, 213
Cal. Rptr. 213, 214 (1985).
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glass since they were not visibly different from shower doors made of
tempered glass.3 2 Despite this, the court declared that the un-
tempered glass shower doors contained a latent defect.
The Becker court's decision in this regard is, however, somewhat
misleading. The untempered glass shower door that caused the in-
jury was not in and of itself defective; untempered glass is simply
more fragile than tempered glass. When subjected to stress, un-
tempered glass naturally shatters. In view of this inherent quality,
the Becker court must have decided that untempered glass shower
doors are defective not simply because they shatter, but because they
put people at risk of severe injury when they do shatter. While other
products may be made of untempered glass, shower doors should not
be. The availability of tempered glass and the fact that the landlord
could have inspected and replaced the shower doors must also have
been a factor affecting the court's decision. In short, Becker indi-
cates that in determining whether a product is defective, one cannot
look at the product alone. One must also consider the environment in
which the product is used and whether its use in that particular envi-
ronment could injure innocent people.
Returning to Hahn, it appears clear that if the fallen tree was not
diseased, it still could have contained a latent defect. A tree that is
situated where its fall may cause injury to innocent people may, in
light of Becker, be considered defective. Moreover, like the residen-
tial landlord in Becker, Hahn had the opportunity to inspect the tree
and take action to ensure the safety of those lunching beneath it.
133
And like the untempered glass door in Becker, the tree should not
have been located where its inherent features posed an unnecessary
risk to those in its proximity.
2. Strict Liability Should Apply to Defective Premises
An opponent of extending strict liability to Hahn may further ar-
gue that Hahn is not a defective product case, but a defective prem-
ises case. This, however, should be of no consequence; whether one
focuses on the product itself or the premises made defective by a
132. Id.
133. Hahn was actually in a better position to prevent the accident than the re-
tailer who sold him the product: unlike the retailer, Hahn was in a position to test the
product once installed. It stands to reason that if retailers are subject to strict liability
despite their lack of opportunity to test products, Hahn should be subject to strict liabil-
ity as well. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 464, 150 P.2d 436, 441-42 (1944); see also supra
note 106 and accompanying text.
defective product within it, the results are the same: the public is at
risk of injury. Moreover, as the Becker court noted: "The fact that
the enterprise is one involving real estate may not immunize the
landlord."' 1 4 This is because "the public interest dictates that the
cost of injury from defects should be borne by the developer who
created the danger and who is in a better economic position to bear
the loss rather than the injured party who relied on the developer's
skill and implied representation."' 35 Plaintiffs in Hahn not only ac-
quired a license to sit at the table, they also acquired a license to use
the premises on which the table was located. Like urban tenants who
expect their dwellings to be in a condition suitable for use, plaintiffs,
as customers of the shopping mall and restaurant, reasonably ex-
pected that they would not encounter unnecessary risks to their
health and safety while shopping or eating outdoors.
Hahn also made implicit representations of safety and suitability
of use to his customers. While such representations of safety are not
yet formally recognized in the context of commercial establishments,
Hahn is in other ways indistinguishable from the residential landlord
in Becker. Consider that as the shopping mall owner, he is in control
of the common areas of the shopping mall, much like the residential
landlord who is strictly liable for injuries resulting from defective
common areas. As the restaurant owner who licensed the use of the
premises where plaintiffs Martin and Rogers sat, he is also not un-
like the residential landlord who is held strictly liable for injuries
resulting from defects in the premises he leases. While Hahn is a
licensor rather than a lessor of premises, he still is in the business of
making developed premises available for public use.
Furthermore, the differences between licenses and leases support
rather than oppose the extension of strict liability to licensors of de-
fective premises. Unlike the lessor, who relinquishes possession and
control of the premises, the licensor merely sells a permit to use. He
may at any time enter the premises himself or revoke the license,
unlike the lessor, who must acquire permission from the lessee in
entering the premises to effectuate repairs and must resort to the
courts to evict the unruly tenant. Residential dwellings are also nor-
mally leased for extended periods of time, whereas licenses to use
normally last for shorter periods of time, and the licensor regains
absolute control after every use. Whether he is a laundromat owner
licensing the use of washing machines or a restaurant owner licens-
ing the use of designated areas in the restaurant, the licensor shares
control of the premises during its licensed use and regains absolute
control more frequently, each time a license expires. With respect to
134. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr at 219.
135. Id. at 460-61, 698 P.2d at 120, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
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the goal of accident reduction, surely the licensor is in a better posi-
tion than the lessor to ensure the safety of the premises. He is also in
as good a position to meet the second goal of strict liability, the dis-
tribution among society of losses due to accidents as a cost of doing
business.
In any event, licensors of products are already held strictly liable.
And in view of Becker, the extension of strict liability to licensors of
premises would hardly constitute an unreasonable or unwarranted
development in the law of torts. On the contrary, application of strict
liability wherever it would promote safety and loss distribution
would benefit society and should be welcome. Consistency, fairness,
and the need for safety in products designed for public use require
the even-handed application of the doctrine of strict liability.
F. Conclusion: The Doctrine's Limitations
The fact pattern in Hahn may be seen to represent the outer limit
of the strict liability expansion proposed here. But while a much
stronger case can be made for injuries resulting from defective res-
taurant chairs or other defective products, as has been shown, Hahn
should nevertheless have been held strictly liable for the injuries
caused by the falling tree. The reader should not conclude, however,
that this Note argues for the application of strict liability to all busi-
ness establishments. Under the extension proposed here, business es-
tablishments that do not invite the public to their premises, such as
business offices and manufacturing plants, would not be subject to
strict liability, but rather to negligence law, like any other landowner
under the principles of Rowland v. Christian. While business estab-
lishments that have no wish to attract the public may be in a better
position to acquire insurance and to spread the cost of accidents than
an apartment dweller or home owner, imposing strict premises liabil-
ity on such businesses would not necessarily reduce the risk of acci-
dents to the public.
One should not forget that strict liability was originally imposed
on manufacturers primarily because they increase the risk of acci-
dents to the public by putting defective products on the market, and
only secondarily because once such accidents occur, it makes more
sense to place the burden of the costs on the party who created the
risk and who is in a better position to spread the cost, rather than on
the injured party, who bears the cost alone and is powerless to pro-
tect himself. That the doctrine of strict liability was designed to re-
duce the incidence of accidents to the public at large is more than
evident from Justice Traynor's continual references to the public in
his Escola opinion, of which the following is one of many examples:
"It is to the public interest to prevent injury to the public from any
defective goods by the imposition of civil liability generally."'13 If
availability of insurance alone were the deciding consideration, then
nearly everyone today would be held strictly liable for injuries due to
accidents in their property whether or not they created the hazard or
in any way contributed to the accident. 37
136. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 464, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added); see also Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defec-
tive Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965).
137. Some commentators of the law have nevertheless proposed that the require-
ment of a defect may not be desirable in strict liability cases because it frustrates both
the policies of accident reduction and risk distribution. For example, Professor Ursin
believes that the doctrine of strict liability should be available to "a customer or a visitor
to a business enterprise who is injured when a stairway railing collapses or a chair gives
way or where a person slips and falls because of a banana peel on the floor." Ursin,
supra note 108, at 821. He also would hold a department store which provides customers
with escalators strictly liable even absent a defect because "persons often trip and fall
while getting off escalators. These injuries are a foreseeable consequence of holding a
business premise open to the public, yet it is difficult to say that escalators are defective
per se." Id. at 828 n.38. But people also trip and fall while walking down stairs with no
defects. In other words, accidents for which no one is to blame do happen, and it would
be unfair to hold business establishments strictly liable when their only contribution to
plaintiff's injuries is that they allowed him to use their escalator or stairs.
Citing Marc A. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal,
24 STAN. L. REv. 439, 461 (1972) and Page Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning
of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 34 (1973), Professor Ursin also uses the argument that
negligence is probably present when a product is defective to support the position that
the requirement of a defect is simply a "short cut" to negligence, a way of assuring that
manufacturers are liable for their negligence. From this it follows that since negligence
law plays no part in strict liability, then neither should the requirement of a defect.
But the premise that negligence is necessarily involved in the manufacturing of all
defective products has its flaws. Manufacturers do not have the benefit of hindsight when
assessing the safety of a product before it is manufactured. There may be products which
are defective not because of an error in judgment, as was the case in Becker and Hahn,
or a mistake in design that could have been prevented, as in Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978), but simply because the
product was manufactured at a point in time when its technology had not yet revealed its
potential flaws or because an unreasonable effort would have been required to expose the
flaw. Such manufacturers cannot possibly be considered negligent, and again it would be
unfair to hold them strictly liable for defects which they could not have possibly antici-
pated, corrected, or warned the public about. Application of strict liability to all manu-
facturers regardless of whether a defect caused the injury would promote the risk
distribution policy and it might even reduce the incidence of accidents, but it would do so
at the cost of chilling the development of innovative products, indeed perhaps of any
products that are connected with injury, such as motorcycle helmets. It is therefore not
surprising that the California Supreme Court has already held that in the case of drugs,
manufacturers are not strictly liable even for design defects, but only for failure to warn
of dangers they knew or reasonably could have known about at the time the drug was
released. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412
(1988). While this position is more tenable for drugs than for consumer goods in general,
holding all manufacturers or all business establishments strictly liable irrespective of the
presence of any defect may prove too costly to society, notwithstanding the value of com-
pensating victims.
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But such a philosophy would foster an attitude of carelessness
rather than carefulness on the part of the ordinary person when en-
tering someone else's property. It might even encourage unreasona-
ble or reasonable risk-taking since a business establishment that is
strictly liable may be required to pay a significant amount for an
accident that is largely the fault of the victim."3 8 While everyone
who is in a position to prevent accidents to the public should be en-
couraged to do so, individuals should not be encouraged to abandon
prudent and responsible behavior.
For these reasons, the possibility of reducing the risk of accidents
to the public, not the possibility of having the costs of accidents cov-
ered by insurance, should be the paramount factor in determining
whether strict liability applies. Indeed, focusing solely on the risk
distribution factor of the strict liability equation would go far in pro-
moting the very irresponsible attitudes that the doctrine was
138. While the California Supreme Court refused to allow the absolute defense of
contributory negligence in strict products liability causes of actions in Luque v. McLean,
8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449-50 (1972), it later
backtracked and extended the principle of comparative fault to strict liability causes of
action. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978). It is important to note that plaintiff's negligence, based on the objective
standard of the reasonable, prudent person, is a factor in the comparative fault equation.
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). And
by allowing the application of comparative fault in strict liability causes of action, the
court, in essence, made it possible to counterbalance manufacturer's responsibility for the
injury with plaintiffs negligence in determining the extent of plaintiff's recovery. Daly,
20 Cal. 3d at 733, 575 P.2d at 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 384. The Daly court reasoned
that strict liability is beyond negligence but less than absolute liability. For example, a
manufacturer cannot be held strictly liable when the injury occurs from an unforeseeable
use of the product.
Because the defense of unreasonable implied assumption of the risk (UIAR) was
equated with the doctrine of contributory negligence and made part of the comparative
fault framework, Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 875, (1975), it appears that UIAR is also available as a partial defense in strict
products liability cases where comparative fault is being applied. The availability of the
absolute defense of reasonable implied assumption of the risk (RIAR) in negligence and
strict liability cases, however, remains unknown. There is a split among the lower courts
as to its survival after Li in negligence actions. Segoviano v. Housing Authority, 143 Cal.
App. 3d 162, 174-75, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578, 587 (1983) (the defense of RIAR no longer
exists). Contra Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 102, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536,
538 (1988) (RIAR is available as a complete defense). It is therefore conceivable that
the California Supreme Court may uphold RIAR as a complete defense in negligence
suits, but make it part of the comparative fault system in strict liability causes of action.
This would make sense given that RIAR works to relieve the defendant of his duty of
reasonable care, a result which for public policy reasons should play no role in strict
liability cases where defects are present. Consequently, landowners or occupiers who are
strictly liable may be held to be somewhat at fault if the condition of the property in any
way contributed to the accident even when the accident was due to a reasonable or un-
reasonable risk on the part of plaintiff.
designed to prevent. In short, because only commercial establish-
ments that attract the public are in a position to reduce the risk of
accidents to the public, only they should be held to the high standard
of strict liability. 3
From this conclusion it follows that not all licensees should have a
right of recovery based on strict liability for injuries incurred in de-
fective premises.' 40 Guests of private residences or business enter-
prises where the public is not invited should not be allowed to
recover under strict premises liability. Again this is because the in-
jury occurred in a private setting where the policy of strict liability
does not apply. For this same reason, not all invitees, but only those
who conduct business in commercial establishments that attract the
public, should be allowed to pursue a strict premises liability cause
of action.
139. Professor Ursin, writing ten years before Becker, predicted the adoption of
strict premises liability. Ursin, supra note 108, at 826. He saw Rowland and Greenman
as intermediate steps in the evolution of enterprise liability, which he believed would
eventually culminate in the extension of strict liability to all defective business premises,
Id. at 821-27. From his perspective, "the policies of accident reduction and risk distribu-
tion demand that the business enterprise be strictly liable for harms caused by defective
premises." Id. at 821.
In his argument, Professor Ursin distinguishes homeowners and apartment dwellers
from business enterprises. While business enterprises are "almost certain to be protected
by insurance, and the cost of this insurance is properly a cost of the business itself,"
homeowners and apartment dwellers are not. Id. at 826 n.34. Imposition of strict liability
on individuals may also be objectionable to some on fairness grounds. This, along with
the notion that imposing strict liability would also encourage business enterprises to mini-
mize accident costs, leads him to the conclusion that "additional safety and liability bur-
dens are more easily justified in the case of business enterprises than in the case of
homeowners and apartment dwellers." Id. at 826. Thus, the prevalence of insurance
seems to be a controlling factor in Professor Ursin's strict premises liability framework.
As has been discussed above, however, strict liability cannot be justified solely on the
grounds of risk distribution. The extent to which the business enterprise places the public
at risk of injury from defective premises or products should be the guiding principle. For
this reason, it is important to make the distinctions among business enterprises discussed
above. Professor Ursin recognized that this presented some line-drawing problems but
felt these were insignificant. Entities which should be subject to strict liability "create a
reasonable expectation of safety in persons who enter their premises, and they are in a
position to safeguard against accidents and to distribute those accident losses which, nev-
ertheless, do occur." Id. at 827 n.37. To this it should be added that only those enter-
prises that put the public at risk should be held strictly liable. All others, though they
may have the wherewithal to buy insurance, are in the same position as apartment dwell-
ers regarding the reduction of accidents to the public and should therefore be similarly
treated.
140. As Garcia demonstrates, however, all commercial licensees of products can
and should recover for injuries due to defective products. This is because while not all
licensors of premises make their premises available to the public (for example, homeown-
ers only furnish their social guests with licenses to enter their homes; see supra note 43),
all commercial licensors of products do make their products available to the public. From
this perspective, the distinction drawn here between commercial licensors of products and
non-commercial licensors of premises regarding the application of strict liability can be
easily supported.
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This is not to say that landlords of shopping malls or other com-
mercial buildings should be excluded from the burdens that should
be imposed on all whose business enterprises affect public health and
safety. As was explained in Part II, there appears to be no justifica-
tion for holding landlords of residential apartment buildings, but not
commercial buildings, strictly liable for injuries sustained in common
areas under their control. As long as one commercial tenant of the
building is attracting the public and provides the public with access
to the building's common areas, the commercial landlord who is in
control of the common area should be just as responsible for acci-
dents incurred on those premises as the commercial tenant should be
for accidents incurred in the leased premises which are under his
control. Of course, commercial landlords and tenants are free to con-
tract among themselves as to who shall be in control of and thus
responsible for common areas. But whoever accepts this responsibil-
ity should also be held strictly liable for any accident incurred due to
defective conditions. The increase in risks to public health and safety
posed by the ever expanding use of technically sophisticated products
and premises requires no less.
Those who oppose this expansion of strict liability for fear of the
rise in litigation that it may produce should recall that strict liability
can only be imposed for defective products and that this Note sup-
ports its expansion to defective premises only. Again, this is because
imposing strict liability for accidents which the commercial estab-
lishment has little chance of preventing would not further strict lia-
bility's goal of accident reduction. 141 And as has been shown above,
the widespread availability of insurance coverage for all types of ac-
cidents may indeed promote the goal of spreading the costs of injury
throughout society as well as lighten the financial burden of injured
parties. But it may also provide incentives for carelessness that
would be undesirable and that would probably be more costly in the
long run. Thus, even commercial establishments that are open to the
141. It is clear that the doctrine of strict liability provides an added incentive to
reduce the risk of accidents. Negligence law is inadequate in reducing the risk of injury
to the public because the difficulty in proving negligence often defeats negligence law-
suits, and this in turn deters injured persons from initiating such lawsuits. Strict liability
amends this problem by providing a remedy for injured persons and a safety incentive to
manufacturers without the need to prove negligence. But this is not to say that the goal
of risk reduction would be best served by applying strict liability as broadly as possible.
Applying strict liability in cases where the defendant business has no control over the
cause of the accident (such as a shopper slipping on liquid spilled by another shopper a
few seconds earlier) would not reduce the risk to the public because the business cannot
prevent the accident regardless of the incentive.
public should not be subject to strict liability for accidents caused by
factors beyond their control.142 In those situations, negligence law,
with its traditional requirement of some measure of fault, would be
the fairer and more appropriate liability rule to apply.
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142. From this perspective, there is no basis for adopting strict liability in the case
of Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 99 Cal. App. 2d 484, 222 P.2d 19 (1950), dis-
cussed earlier. Plaintiff in Brown was apparently injured by a foul ball at a baseball park.
Her baseball injuries were not the result of a defect in the ball or the park. Id. at 485-86,
222 P.2d at 20. However, one could argue that the baseball park may be considered
defective, much like the shower door in Becker, since the park owner could have installed
screens in front of all the seats to ensure the safety of all the fans. But in contrast to
plaintiff in Becker, who would have preferred a tempered glass door, baseball fans, in
general, probably would not prefer a fully screened park- many fans enjoy the opportu-
nity to catch a batted ball, and this opportunity is one of the reasons for coming to the
game. This helps explain why park owners who provide as many screened seats as fans
can reasonably be expected to call for on an ordinary occasion meet their duty of care
under negligence law. Id. at 487, 222 P.2d at 21. Had the victim's injury in Brown
resulted from a defect in her seat, however, strict liability should have applied. In that
situation, the goals of accident reduction and risk distribution would have been served by
adopting strict liability.
